For anyone holding assets in a yield vault, the key question is whether its reported share value matches the assets depositors can actually redeem. A report published on November 19, 2026, said an attacker exploited that accounting boundary in K3 Capital’s Ethereum sBOLD savings vault, draining approximately $3.4 million in liquidity through 97 transactions over roughly eight minutes.

How the reported exploit worked
sBOLD is a yield-bearing vault built around BOLD, a stablecoin associated with Liquity. Citing Bitquery’s reconstruction of the transactions, the report said the attacker repeatedly deposited BOLD, introduced wrapped ether (WETH) that was not accounted for on the vault’s balance sheet, and exchanged it internally for BOLD. This inflated the calculated redemption value of each sBOLD share, allowing withdrawals at the inflated value from funds deposited by other users.
The report also described a competition over the proceeds. It said an automated bot copied and replaced parameters from a withdrawal transaction broadcast by the original attacker, then withdrew about $1.91 million—56.18% of the reported $3.4 million total. The bot paid approximately $1.78 million in priority fees to block builders, leaving about $130,000 in net arbitrage proceeds, according to the report. It attributed approximately $520,000 in net proceeds to the original attacker and an initial funding wallet.
The $1.78 million figure was gross fee revenue for builders, not necessarily their profit: the report noted that builders must also bid for block proposals through MEV-Boost. It named Titan as handling most blocks containing the bot’s transactions, with BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar also involved in ordering related blocks.

Audit warning and recovery work
ChainSecurity completed an audit of the sBOLD protocol in May 2025 that warned of a route to extracting excess value through self-liquidation. As of the November 19 report, whether this attack used that specific mechanism was still being investigated; the earlier warning should not be treated as a confirmed explanation of the exploit.
The report identified restricting transfers of non-allowlisted tokens, limiting redemptions per block and using time-weighted oracles as potential safeguards for ERC-4626 vaults. It did not establish that those measures had been implemented in sBOLD. It said the team was working with tracing firms to monitor possible cross-chain movement of funds while assessing affected depositors’ losses and repairing the vault code. For depositors, the unresolved points are the final loss assessment and what the repair changes about asset accounting and redemptions.


