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Bitcoin’s quantum risk: what holders can address now, and what remains unresolved

For a long-term Bitcoin holder, the most practical quantum-security question is whether an address has been reused. Reuse can expose a public key long before the funds are spent. Moving funds to an unused address can reduce that existing exposure, but it does not resolve every potential quantum attack.

This article reflects a report jointly published by Bitcoin Security Consortium and Presidio Bitcoin, translated by TechFlow and published on November 12, 2026, at 09:58 UTC+8. At that time, the report said no cryptographically relevant quantum computer had been demonstrated. Its discussion of attacks concerns what such a machine could do, not a confirmed theft.

Two different windows of exposure

A sufficiently capable quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in principle, derive a Bitcoin private key from an exposed public key. The report distinguishes two ways that exposure matters:

  • At rest: Public keys are already visible for some older pay-to-public-key (P2PK) outputs and funds held at reused addresses. Project Eleven estimated that roughly 7.1 million BTC, about 35% of total supply, would be at risk if a capable machine existed at the time of its estimate. The report says about three-quarters of that amount was held at reused addresses, largely associated with major exchanges. That is an estimate of potential exposure, not a loss.
  • In flight: Spending from an output that had previously hidden its public key reveals that key. The report describes a possible attack window between transaction submission and inclusion in a block—often discussed as roughly 10 minutes, but dependent on when confirmation occurs. It cites a Google estimate of as little as 9 minutes to derive one private key using a hypothetical, sufficiently fast quantum device.

Keeping a public key hidden until spending therefore helps with at-rest exposure, but would not by itself eliminate the proposed in-flight risk. The report does not suggest that Bitcoin’s issuance schedule or supply cap would be broken by this signature attack.

Why the risk is neither immediate nor dismissible

The report cites Google’s Willow error-correction demonstration and theoretical improvements to Shor-algorithm circuits, including an approximately 20-fold reduction reported by Google and a subsequent reduction of nearly 70% in circuit size through ECDSA.fail. It also describes IonQ’s theoretical blueprint as requiring around 26 days per attempt, with a 63.3% success probability. These are research results and estimates, not demonstrations of a machine stealing Bitcoin.

According to the report, the strongest publicly demonstrated system had 48 error-corrected logical qubits, while attacking Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve signatures would require at least approximately 1,200. Scaling reliable computation remains a major engineering hurdle. Conversely, the report notes uncertainty about when that hurdle might be crossed; it cites an expert survey assigning about a 50% probability to a capable machine emerging during 2030–2035. That is a forecast, not a deadline for holders.

What can be done—and what needs consensus

The report’s near-term measure is to avoid address reuse and move vulnerable funds to unused addresses. That step does not require a Bitcoin network change, although moving funds itself involves spending a transaction. It cannot recover funds whose keys have been lost.

Longer-term protection would require a quantum-resistant signing method. The report discusses Blockstream’s proposed SHRINCS scheme, tested on Liquid in March 2026, with a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal published with contributors in August 2026. Its formal security proof was still in progress at the report’s publication; network-wide deployment would require a soft fork.

Older P2PK funds pose a separate governance question because many may no longer have an owner able to move them. In one part of the report, roughly 1.8 million BTC is described as dormant in P2PK outputs; a later discussion gives approximately 1.7 million BTC across 20,000 P2PK addresses, including an estimated 1.1 million BTC attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto. These are the report’s differing approximate figures, not confirmed recoverable balances. Presidio Bitcoin outlines three proposals under discussion: leave legacy spending valid, limit the rate of legacy spending, or freeze it while providing a proposed zero-knowledge-proof recovery route. The report presents no settled network decision.

For holders, avoiding reuse is a manageable check supported by the report. It reduces one identified exposure; it is not a guarantee against future attacks or a substitute for a broader recovery plan.

Source: techflowpost.com (originally published 2026-11-12 09:58 UTC+8)

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